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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT LEE JONES 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
CLAUDIUS D. KNUTSON and 
SALT LAKE CITY LINES, a 
Utah corporation 
Defendants and Appellants 
No. 10163 
STATEMENT O·F THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries arising out of 
a collision between the plaintiff driving his automobile 
and the bus of defendant Salt Lake City Lines. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER CO·URT 
The case was tried to a jury. From a verdict and 
judgment for the plaintiff, defendants appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek reversal of the judgment, and a 
judgment of dismissal, or, failing that, a new trial. 
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STATEMENT 0'F FACTS 
The facts in this case are relatively simple and should 
give rise to very little dispute. Plaintiff, Robert Lee Jones, 
brought suit for injuries allegedly resulting from defendant 
Knutson's operation of the bus of defendant, Salt Lake 
City Lines. Plaintiff claims that Mr. Knutson negligently 
drove the bus into the back end of a car being driven by 
plaintiff. The accident occurred November 2, 1961, at 
about four o'clock in the afternoon, while the bus was 
proceeding down Ninth South Street in Salt Lake City. 
The weather was clear and the street was dry (Tr. 2-3). 
At the place of collision Ninth South Street has a steep 
grade and consists of four traffic lanes, two running east 
and two west (Tr. 3). The street is approximately 62 
feet wide and the outside lane (next to the curb) is 19 
feet 8 inches wide, while the inside lane is 11 feet across 
(Tr. 10). The street was divided up the center by two 
yellow lines about 4 inches apart (Tr. 12). According to 
the investigating officer, the collision point was about 15 
feet from the north curb of Ninth South Street, thus 
placing it in the outside lane (Tr. 10). 
Just prior to the collision, Mr. Knutson was driving 
his loaded bus west on Ninth South and made a safety 
stop at Twelfth East Street to check his air brakes before 
proceeding down the hill immediately before him (Tr. 
66). His brakes were in good order (Tr. 71). As he 
started up, he observed plaintiff's automobile stopped 
between the two lanes of traffic on the north of Ninth 
South. The door was open and a person later identified 
as the driver, Mr. Jones, was leaning out and picking up 
some object from the street. The driver then closed the 
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door and proceeded west down the hill, pulling slightly to 
the right and continuing in the outside lane; he then made 
an unexpected stop in a double parked position about half 
way down the hill toward Eleventh East Street. The bus 
was following plaintiff's car some 70 feet back and at a 
speed between ten and twelve miles per hour. Mr. Knutson 
had his foot on the air brake pedal all the way dovrn the 
hill (Tr. 66, 67). As the bus and plaintiff's car proceeded 
down the hill from Twelfth East, they were traveling 
about the same speed (Tr. 74). The brake lights of the 
Jones' auto were going on and off while it went down 
the hill (Tr. 68). Marry Ferris, a passenger in the front 
scat of the bus, described plaintiff's second stop as tea 
sudden, unexpected stop" (Tr. 75). Plaintiff himself 
testified that he gave no arm signal for this second stop 
(Tr. 51). Upon observing that stop, the bus driver 
sounded his horn and put on his brakes with such force 
that Miss Ferris was thrown against the seat and ((school 
books were thrown all over" (Tr. 75). Almost immedi-
atelr thereafter, the collision occurred. At that time 
another vehicle was passing the bus heading west in the 
left lane and prevented Mr. Knutson from going around 
plaintiff's car (Tr. 67). Apparently the bus, in stopping, 
left no skid marks (Tr. 7). When it hit the rear end of 
the Jones' car, the bus was going about two miles per 
hour. It proceeded about two feet after the impact (Tr. 
14, 68) . Plaintiff made his second stop as his car drew 
opposite an automobile parked next to the curb. I-Ie 
therefore had brought his car to a stop in the traveled 
portion of the outside lane of traffic, then being used 
by the bus (Tr. 25, 27, 76). 
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The events surrounding plaintiff's operation of the 
car at the time of the accident were detailed in plaintiff's 
testimony and that of his passenger, Gayle Meier. Mr. 
Jones happened to be following a woman's car west down 
9th South Street in the right hand lane of traffic when 
he saw some object fall from the top of her car. That 
was just below Twelfth East Street and at the time he 
was quite a ways behind her car. The lady driver stopped 
on the side of the road, alighted from her car and picked 
up an object from the street. Upon that occurrence, Jones 
gave an arm stop signal, stopped his car about one and 
one-half feet over the white line dividing the two west 
bound lanes of Ninth South Street, opened his left door 
and while sitting in the driver's seat, stooped down and 
retrieved the lady's shoe (Tr. 24). Jones then drove what 
he estimated as about fifty feet further down the hill, 
to a point alongside the lady's parked car, where his 
passenger friend, Mr. Meier, ccreached across and handed 
her the shoe" (Tr. 25, 26.) Mr. Meir's recollection was 
that Mr. Jones first and second stops were a fifth of a 
block or less apart (Tr. 17). 
About a minute to a minute and a half elapsed be-
tween Jones' first stop and the time the vehicles hit 
(Tr. 17). The shortness of the second stop is well indicated 
by Mr. Meier's testimony that he ccwas in the act of hand-
ing them to (the lady) Miss Warner who was in the 
parking lane, the extreme right area shown in the diagram, 
when the bus hit us in the rear ... " (Tr. 16). Jones held 
his foot on the brake pedal all the way down the hill and 
while stopped to deliver the shoe (Tr. 25, 26). Jones 
never saw the bus at any time prior to the collision (Tr. 
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:!8). Just before the impact he heard the bus horn sound 
two or three times, and as he turned to look, the collision 
occurred (Tr. 25). Jones testified that his car had a large 
rear window and if he had looked into his rear view mirror, 
he could have seen the bus following him (Tr. 49). At 
the time, no cars were parked either in front or to the 
rear of the lady's parked car, so that Jones could have 
pulled over to the curb and stopped before delivering the 
shoe to the lady (Tr. 50). 
The record contains evidence that at the time of 
the accident the brakes on the bus were inadequate to 
stop it after Mr. Knutson saw the Jones car make the 
last stop. Miss Ferris testified that the bus driver put on 
the brakes when Jones stopped, and ((the bus was stopping 
but it couldn't stop in time. He hit the car" (Tr. 75). 
Mr. Knutson, just after the accident, told the investigating 
officer that he had ((put on the brakes all the way as 
hard as they would go. It seemed like the bus wouldn't 




(A) THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENY-
ING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR A DIRECTED 
VERDICT AND FOR JUDGMENT NO~TWITH­
STANDING THE VERDICT, BECAUSE PLAINTIFF 
WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW AND 
HIS NEGLIGENCE WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF 
THE DAMAGE SUFFERED BY PLAINTIFF. 
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(B) THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTIO,N NO. 
7 THAT PLAINTIFF WOULD BE NEGLIGENT AS A 
MATTER OF LAW IN FAILING TO GIVE A HAND 
SIGNAL PRIO·R TO HIS STOPPING. 
Appellants here contend that plaintiff's conduct as 
he proceeded down 9th South Street just before and up 
until the collision with the bus, constitutes contributory 
negligence as a matter of law. 
Plaintiff testified that he gave no arm or hand sig-
nal for his second stop on 9th South Street (Tr. 51). 
Under the circumstances existing just prior to the acci-
dent, the flashing of the brake lights of the Jones car 
moving down the hill was not a legally sufficient notice 
that Mr. Jones was going to stop in the lane of traffic, 
double parked. The normal procedure for a driver trav-
eling down a grade such as 9th South Street is to apply 
the brakes intermittently until the car reaches the bot-
tom of the hill. 
The applicable Utah statutes provide: (U.C.A. 
1953) 
41-6-69 (c) No person shall stop or sud-
denly decrease the speed of a vehicle without first 
giving an appropriate signal in the manner pro-
vided herein to the driver of any vehicle immedi-
ately to the rear when there is opportunity to give 
such signal. 
41-6-70 Signals-Method of giving-Sig-
nal lamps.-(a) The signals herein ·required shall 
be given either by means of the hand and arm or by 
a signal of a type approved by the state road com-
mission, ::· ::- * 
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41-6-103. Stopping, standing or parking-
Prohibition as to specified places. (a) No person 
shall stop, stand or park a vehicle, except when 
necessary to avoid conflict with other traffic or 
in compliance with law or the directions of a po-
lice officer or traffic-control device, in any of the 
following places: 
( 12) On the roadway side of any vehicle 
stopped or parked at the edge or curb of a street. 
When the facts of this case are closely examined, it 
becomes evident that plaintiff was guilty of contributory 
negligence on two counts: failure to give a proper stop 
signal, and stopping in the lane of traffic being used by 
the bus. Each of these neglectful acts contributed to the 
accident and each in itself is a bar to plaintiff's recovery 
against defendants. 
Defendants' requested instruction No. 7, refused by 
the trial court, correctly states the law applicable where 
a driver fails to give a proper stop signal. That instruction 
reads: 
((You are instructed that Utah law provides 
that no person shall stop or suddenly decrease the 
speed of a motor vehicle without first giving an 
appropriate signal to the driver of any vehicle im-
mediately to the rear when there is opportunity to 
give such signal. In this regard, the mere visible 
light showing the application of the brakes is not 
compliance with Utah law but the giving of an ap-
propriate signal in this regard would require the 
giving of a hand signal. 
Therefore, if you find that the plaintiff in this 
action stopped or suddenly decreased the speed of 
his vehicle without first giving a hand signal to the 
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driver of the vehicle immediately to its rear and 
that the plaintiff further had an opportunity to 
give such a signal, then you will f'ind that the 
plaintiff was contributorily negHgent." 
None of the Court's instructions contained the point 
of law raised by the above instruction No. 7. Thus the 
trial court withheld from the jury's. consideration a ma-
terial element in the determination of plaintiff's contribu-
tory negligence, and denied defendants the right to have 
their theory of the case presented to the jury on the facts 
before it. 
We have emminent judicial authority to support the 
appellants' arguments. 
The general rule, followed by the Utah Supreme 
Court, is that a driver's violation of a motor vehicle sta-
tute is negligence as a matter of law. In North vs. Cart-
wright, 119 Utah 516, 229 P. 2d 871, the Court had be-
fore it an action for injuries sustained by a minor while 
riding a motor scooter. The scooter had crossed over to 
the wrong side of the road just before the collision. Plain-
tiff was also carrying a passenger on his motor bike. The 
evidence established that the defendant was turning his 
car to the left in the proper lane at the time the scooter 
hit the defendant's automobile. The Supreme Court up-
held the Trial Court's direction of a verdict for defendant 
for the ·reason that plaintiff was guilty of contributory 
negligence as a matter of law. The Court observed that 
plaintiff was guilty of violating two Utah statutes uupon 
which negligence in law may be predicated." Plaintiff 
was running his scooter on the wrong side of the highway 
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and was carrying a passenger contrary to the Utah law. 
The Court stated: 
uThese statutes were promulgated for the pro-
tection of the public and to safeguard property, 
life and limb of persons using the highways from 
accidents of the type here involved. Violations of 
these statutes then constitute negligence in law. 
This doctrine of the law has been steadfastly ad-
hered to by this court and generally in other courts 
throughout the United States." 
The Court further found that plaintiff's violation of 
the statutory standards of care was. a proximate contri-
buting cause of the injury and therefore he is, ubarred 
from recovery as a matter of law." The Court's defini-
tion is particularly applicable here to Mr. Jones' negli-
gence. Quoting from Farrell v. Cameron, 98 Utah 68, 
94. P 2d 1068, 1075, the Court stated: 
((Proximate cause is that cause which, in na-
tural or continued sequence, unbroken by any new, 
intervening, efficient cause, produced the result 
complained of, and without which the damage 
would not have been sustained." 
In Morbey v. Rogers, 122 Utah 540, 252 P. 2d 231, 
the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule that violation 
of a statutory duty resulting from the operation of an 
automobile constitutes negligence a matter of law, but 
made an exception for a thirteen-year-old boy who was 
riding a bicycle when struck by an on-coming car. The 
Court cited and approved North v. Cartwright, supra. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals passed upon the 
above Utah statute on signaling for a stop, in the case of 
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United States vs. First Security Bank, 208 F. 2d 424 
(CA lOth, 1953). There, the plaintiff brought suit against 
the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for 
injuries sustained in an accident involving three cars, one 
of which was a United States mail carrier. Vernon, a 
rural route mail carrier, was delivering mail during the 
day and slowed down and finally stopped to make a mail 
delivery. Vernon put on his brakes, but made no hand 
signal whatsoever. A truck pulling a house trailer be-
hind Vernon, and of which he was aware, applied its brakes 
in response to the brake lights of the Vernon automobile 
and the house trailer swung over into the plaintiff's lane of 
traffic, causing the collision with the plaintiff's auto-
mobile. The plaintiff contended that the defendant~ Ver-
non, was the cause of the accident and was negligent in 
failing to give an appropriate signal when he was stop-
ping or decreasing the speed of his vehicle. 
The Court, on page 429, stated: 
t(The statute (U.C.A. 41-6-60c) required 
Vernon to give an appropriate signal before stop-
ping or suddenly decreasing his speed. No hand 
signal was given. It is urged that the visible light 
showing application of Vernon's brakes complied 
with the statute. A fair inference to be drawn 
from the testimony of Mardis and his wife is that 
the brake light signal which was given by the Ver-
non automobile was simultaneous with its sudden 
decrease in speed. Under such circumstances, the 
signal was not effective and was not in compliance 
with the statute which provides that an appropri-
ate signal must be given prior to stopping or sud-
denly decreasing the speed of a vehicle." 
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The Circuit Court (208 F. 2d 429) concurred in the 
trial court's finding that Vernon's negligence in so stop-
ping was a proximate cause of the collision. The opinion 
states: 
((* ):- ),'- Assuming that Mardis was negligent 
and that without such negligence the collision 
would not have occurred, it is equally true that 
without Vernon's negligence the collision would 
not have occurred." 
In 29 A.L.R. 2d 5, is an exhaustive annotation upon 
the subject of a sudden or improperly signaled stop. While 
the decisions there annotated present a diversity of opinion, 
the following summary statement by the author (page 
12) is significant in our case: 
((The cases present little controversy as to the 
existence of a duty upon the part of the operator 
of a motor vehicle to first take reasonable observa-
tions to determine that the movement can be made 
with safety to others, before stopping or slowing 
his vehicle, and to give a proper signal or warning 
of his intention where others may be affected." 
As the cases in the above annotation illustrate, a dis-
tinction is made, and rightly so, between an abrupt stop 
made because of an emergency and one not so caused. In 
our situation, Mr. Jones' second stop, made in the lane 
of traffic, was not the result of any emergency. 
In the aforesaid A.L.R. discussion are a number of 
decisions holding that actuating the brake lights is not a 
sufficient stop signal to free the driver of the charge of 
negligence. The annotation, at page 31, states the rule 
thus: 
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nBut the fact that the stopping car was 
equipped with rear lights operating off the brakes 
has been held not necessarily to relieve the driver of 
negligence in stopping suddenly ahead of another 
driver, even though the relevant statute provided 
for the giving of stop signals by an electrical or 
mechanical device." 
A California decision passing upori a stop signal 
statute like Utah's law is Donahue v. Mazzoli, 80 Pac. 2 
743. The plaintiff's car ran into defendant's truck as the 
vehicles were proceeding in the same direction at about 18 
miles per hour. The plaintiff had been behind the truck 
for some time prior to the collision. Defendant had 
abruptly stopped his truck in the line of traffic and plain-
tiff had failed to stop in time to avert the rear-end colli-
sion. The accident happened in broad daylight and the 
weather was clear and the streets were dry. The evidence 
established that the plaintiff's car was about 16 feet back 
when the defendant stopped. Defendant's truck was 
equipped with a signal light ccapproved by the Department 
of Motor Vehicles of California" and was in good work-
ing order. Defendant maintained not only that he had 
given an arm signal but that because of the signal lamp on 
his car he was not required to give a hand signal. He 
relied upon the California Code which contains the iden-
tical words of the Utah statute as to approval of the signal 
device by the Motor Vehicle Department. 
The court ruled that the use of the signal light did 
not absolve defendant from negligence. Said the court: 
n* * * Under all circumstances the defendants 
were bound to use ·reasonable care in the operation 
of the truck. To that end they were bound to 
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comply with the provisions of the law (sees. 544 
and 545, supra) regarding signals. But those sec-
tions prescribe cumulative duties and do not les-
sen the obligations of the defendants under gen-
eral law. . . . Under the common law and under 
the statute ... they were bound to so operate their 
truck as to abstain from injuring the person or 
property of another. Furthermore, under section 
505 of the Vehicle Code, St. 1935, p. 175, they 
were inhibited from operating their truck in a 
reckless manner. * * *" 
A case pertinent to our fact situation in certain re-
spects is Dunaway v. Cade (La) 39 So. 2d 148, where 
the plaintiff ran his bicycle into the rear of the defendant's 
car as it unexpectedly stopped in the thoroughfare. The 
case does not indicate whether the statute provides for the 
giving of a stop signal by a light. 
The defendant driver was not faced with any emer-
gency but voluntarily stopped his automobile without giv-
ing a hand signal. The court held, among other things, 
that the use of the brake light signal did not excuse the 
driver from giving the proper hand signal. The defendant 
testified that he had not seen the approaching vehicle in 
his rear view mirror prior to the accident. O·n that point, 
the Court had this to say: 
((* * * Also, Cade was negligent for if he 
looked in his rear view mirror and did not see 
young Dunaway, he should have seen him, and if he 
did not look, he should have looked, either in the 
rear view mirror or in some other manner, prior to 
stopping his automobile in the lane of traffic on 
the pavement without any signal except possibly 
a stop light warning. 
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uFor these reasons, we are of the opinion that 
the judgment of the District Court in holding that 
the negligence of Cade was a proximate cause of 
the accident is correct." 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL CO·URT ERRED IN GIVING THE 
]UR Y AN INSTRUCTION UPON THE THEO·R Y OF 
LAST CLEAR CHANCE 
By Instruction No. 9, the Court, over the objection 
of defendants, presented to the jury the doctrine of last 
clear chance as follows: 
INSTRUCTIO·NS NO. 9 
Under ce:rtain circumstances a plaintiff is 
entitled to a verdict against a defendant even 
though the plaintiff be guilty of contributory 
negligence. This rule of law that thus permits 
a negligent plaintiff to recover judgment is known 
as the doctrine of last clear chance. If you deter-
mine that the plaintiff was in fact guilty of con-
tributory negligence, you should then consider 
whether or not the doct·rine of last clear chance 
is applicable to this case . The doctrine of last clear 
chance is applicable only if you find from a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that each of the fol-
lowing six propositions is true. 
1. That the plaintiff was in a position of 
danger. 
2. That he was by reason of inattention or 
lack of proper alertness totally una.ware of the 
peril that threatened him. 
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3. That the defendant actually saw the plain-
tiff and knew of his perilous position. 
4. That the defendant then realized or by 
the exercise of due care should have realized that 
the plaintiff was unaware of the danger to himself. 
5. That at the time the defendant saw the 
plaintiff and knew of the peril to him and realized 
or should have realized that the plaintiff was obli-
vious to the danger, he then had a clear opportunity 
to avoid the accident by the exercise of ordinary 
care and with his then existing ability. There must 
have been an actual opportunity existing at that 
moment for the defendant to avoid the accident. 
Also, it must have been a fair, clear opportunity 
and not just a bare possibility of doing so. 
6. That the defendant then negligently failed 
to avail himself of that clear opportunity and as a 
proximate result the plaintiff was injured. 
If you find that each of the above six proposi-
tions is true, the doctrine of last clear chance is 
applicable to this case, and the plaintiff is entitled 
to a verdict in his favor even though you find him 
guilty of contributory negligence. If you find 
that anyone of the above six propositions is not 
true, the doctrine of last clear chance has no 
application and cannot be invoked by the plaintiff. 
Defendants took their exception to the above instruc-
tion, and raised the point again in their motion for a new 
trial, which the lower Court denied. Appellants here assert 
that the last clear chance doctrine has no application to 
the facts of our case. Let us examine the law to be 
applied in resolving this issue. In Anderson v. Bingham & 
Garfield Railway Company, 117 Utah 197, 214 P.2d 607, 
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the Utah Supreme Court accepted the definition of the 
last clear chance doctrine as adopted by the Restatement 
of Torts, and quoted Section 480 thereof: 
ccA plaintiff, who, by the exercise of reasonable 
,,,_,.;."'vigilance could have observed the danger created 
by the defendant's negligence in time to have 
avoided harm therefrom, may recover if, but only 
if, the defendant 
(a) knew of the plaintiff's situation, and 
(b) realized or had reason to realize that the 
plaintiff was inattentive and therefore 
unlikely to discover his peril in time to 
avoid harm, and 
(c) thereafter is negligent in failing to utilize 
with reasonable care and competence his 
then existing ability to avoid harming the 
plaintiff." 
The comment on clause (c) , found under Sec. 479 
is as follows= 
cc (f) Antecedent lack of preparation. * * * 
If the defendant, after discovering the plaintiff's 
peril, does all that can reasonably be expected 
of him, the fact that his efforts are defeated by 
antecedent lack of preparation or a previous course 
of negligent conduct is not sufficient to make him 
liable. All that is required of him is that he use 
carefully his then available ability. Thus, if A, a 
railroad engineer, discovers a wayfarer helpless on 
a highway crossing which he has entered without 
taking precautions to see whether a train was 
approaching, and A thereafter does all which is 
then in his power to stop the train before it hits 
the traveler, the traveler may not recover against 
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the railroad although his position was seen in ample 
time to stop the train had the brakes not been negli-
gently permitted to be in bad condition .. So too, 
if a railroad train is exceeding the statutory speed 
limit in approaching a level crossing but the engi-
neer does not see the plaintiff's helpless peril on 
the crossing in time to stop the train, the fact that 
the train could have stopped in the distance be-
tween the two points had it been going at the law-
ful speed is not enough to make the defendant 
liable to the negligent plaintiff." 
The facts of the above case are briefly as follows: 
The plaintiff was injured in a railroad crossing accident 
and alleged that the train had defective brakes in violation 
of the Federal Safety Appliance Act. Under··· one of the 
court's instructions, the jury was entitled to find that the 
defendant had a last clear chance to avoid injury to the 
plaintiff. A verdict of no cause of action was returned. 
The plaintiff appealed, contending that the instructions 
to the jury were erroneous in several particulars, thereby 
clouding and confusing the issue whether the defendant 
had a last clear chance. O·n appeal, the· Supreme Court of 
Utah held that an instruction on last clear chance was not 
applicable. The court, on page 200, stated: 
uThere is a diversity of judicial opinion in this 
country as to the question presented by the fact 
situation of this case. Stated succinctly the question 
is this: Does a precedent act of negligence on the 
part of a defendant, whether it be of omission or 
commission, whereby the defendant has rendered 
himself powerless to avert an accident after dis-
covering that it is impending, make the defendant 
liable to a plaintiff who has through his own 
negligence exposed himself to peril?" 
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Justice Wolfe then concluded: 
ccAfter a careful review of the cases in which 
the question before us has arisen and the reasoning 
employed by the courts to justify their positions, 
we are firmly convinced that there is no logical or 
justifiable basis why, under the facts of the instant 
case, the question of last clear chance should have 
been submitted to the jury. Equality in treatment 
to plaintiffs and defendants demands that the doc-
trine of last clear chance be not invoked unless 
there is evidence that with the means at hand the 
defendant clearly could have avoided injury to the 
plaintiff." 
In reaching its conclusion in the Anderson case the 
Court observed: 
ecEven Missouri under its broad humanitarian 
doctrine has not seen fit to hold a defendant liable 
who was unable to avoid injury to a negligent 
plaintiff because of the defendent's own antecedent 
negligence. The humanitarian doctrine cseizes upon 
the situation as it then exists~- ~- ~-. The ruling that 
antecedent negligence of a defendant may be taken 
into consideration in determining whether he was 
negligent under the humanitarian rule would in 
many cases permit an unwarranted recovery 
for primary negligence (antecedent negligence) 
through the elimination, under the guise of that 
rule, of the defense of contributory negligence.' 
State ex rei. Fleming v. Bland, supra, 15 S.W. 2d 
80 1." 
The Utah Court also commented that it cccannot under 
the thin guise of the last clear chance doctrine compare 
degrees of negligence ~:- ),'- *. A driver (of a vehicle) upon 
the highway does not carry with him an canticipatory last 
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clear chance obligation', ie. he need not drive so as to 
create a last clear chance opportunity for others." 
The above statements by Judge Wolfe are very per-
tinent to defendants' situation in the instant case. If Mr. 
Knutson, the bus driver, was driving at an excessive speed 
as he came down 9th South, or if his brakes were such that 
he could not stop in the distance existing between him and 
the plaintiff's car when Jones made the final stop, such a 
circumstance, whether negligence or not, does not carry 
over to the time when the peril arose, ie, when Mr. Jones 
made his second stop. 
Later Utah decisions have closely analyzed the doctrine 
of last clear chance. A review of those Supreme Court 
cases shows there is no legal justification for applying that 
doctrine to the facts of the present case. 
In Compton v. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Co., 23 5 
P.2d 515, 120 Utah 453, the decedent, represented by 
plaintiff, was struck and killed by defendant's engine 
while she was walking along the tracks in the 0 gden yards 
during the daylight hours. She was using a path which had 
been availed of by employees of various companies for 
some time. The evidence indicated that the engine was 
proceeding about 10 miles per hour and stopped within 
SO feet after striking decedent who was walking with her 
hack to the engine. The train gave no audible signal and 
none of the train crew was in a position to observe ahead 
on the side of the track the decedent was then using. The 
plaintiff appealed from a judgment dismissing the case, 
and one ground was the lower court's failure to submit 
to the jury the question of last clear chance. 
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After deciding that the deceased was guilty of con-
tributory negligence as a matter of law, the Court pro-
ceeded to discuss the last clear chance doctrine and par-
ticularly Sections 479 and 48 0 of the Restatement of 
Torts, Vol II. The Court correctly concluded that Sec-
tion 479 applies to the situation where the plaintiff is in 
a position of ((inextricable peril" and therefore the defen-
dant alone has the last clear chance to avert the accident. 
Section 479 provides that the negligent plaintiff may 
recover ((if, immediately preceding the harm, (a) the 
plaintiff is unable to avoid it by the exercise of reasonable 
vigilance and care ~- * ::- ". The Court stated that the rule 
of Section 479 is applicable ((only if the plaintiff's negli-
gence has come to rest and plaintiff is thereafter unable 
by the exercise of reasonable care to avoid the injury her-
self". The decision then held that decedent was not in a 
situation covered by that Section. Two of the Court's 
illustrations of inextricable peril show the difference be-
tween that situation and our set of facts. In one case the 
boy was lying on the railroad tracks either asleep or un-
conscious. In the other example, the decedent had been 
injured and was lying between the tracks unable to escape 
when the train passed over him. The Court made this 
pertinent observation: ((we have never held that a mere 
continuance of the same inattentive negligence created a 
situation of inextricable peril. ::- * ::-" 
Hit follows, thus, that the doctrine of last 
clear chance does not include cases in which a plain-
tiff has the physical and mental ability to avoid the 
risk up to the moment of the harm. His (continu-
ing' negligence, as it is sometimes called, continues 
to insulate the defendant's negligence, and the or-
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dinary rule of contributory negligence governs the 
case. 
, 
The Compton case then proceeded to review with 
approval Section 480 of the said Restatement of Torts, 
quoted c~ulier in this brief. The Court stated that plain-
tiff may recover under that section from a defendant who 
knows of plaintiff's situation and realizes, or has reason 
to realize, that plaintiff is inattentive and unlikely to dis-
cover his peril in time to avoid harm, and defendants there-
after is negligent in failing to use ordinary care with the 
means at his disposal to avoid harming him. For plaintiff 
to recover under the facts before the Court in the Comp-
ton case, it would be necessary, stated the Court, that 
plaintiff first prove defendant knew the decedent was in 
a position of peril. The Court ruled that defendant did 
not know of decedent's peril, and affirmed the lower 
Court's judgment in favor of defendant. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Cox v. Thompson, 254 
P. 2d 1047, 123 Utah 81, had under consideration a suit 
for wrongful death of a pedestrian struck by defendant's 
automobile while crossing the street. The accident oc-
curred at night on a poorly lighted highway and the evi-
dence showed that the deceased was walking into the path 
of the car when hit. While the facts are not in line with 
the situation of our present case, the law announced by 
the Court is a guide in applying the last clear chance doc-
trine. The trial court had directed a verdict for defendant 
because decedent was found to be contributorily negligent 
as a matter of law. The Supreme Court upheld the trial 
court's refusal to submit the case to the jury on a theory 
of last clear chance. Defendant in that case saw what 
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appeared to be a shadow, step into the street directly into 
the lights of defendant's car. D·efendant swerved his car 
sharply in an attempt to avoid the decedent. The testi-
mony was that defendant was traveling about 35 miles an 
hour at the time. In holding that the last clear chance 
doctrine did not apply to the facts in the case the Court 
stated: 
((The evidence must be such as would in all 
probability reasonably support a finding that there 
was a fair and clear opportunity, in the exercise of 
reasonable care, to avoid the injury. It would not 
be sufficient that it appear from hindsight that by 
some possible measure the defendant by the (skin of 
his teeth' could have avoided the injury. See A1orby 
v. Rogers, 122 Utah 540, 252 P. 2d 231." 
The Court followed the language of the Conzpton case, 
supra, in these words: 
((Thus the matter was properly withheld from 
the jury if the evidence taken in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, would not reasonably 
and clearly support a finding that (a) defendant 
knew of decedent's situation of danger, and (b) 
realized or had reason to realize that plaintiff was 
inattentive and unlikely to discover his peril in 
time to avoid harm, and (c) the defendant was 
thereafter negligent in failing to utilize with reason-
able care and competence his then existing ability 
to avoid harming decedent." 
The Court applied statistics obtained from a publi-
cation of the Utah State Highway Patrol and determined 
that in view of the distance the defendant first noticed 
the decedent, which varied up to 57 feet, ((it seems clear 
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that defendant could not have avoided the impact by the 
application of his brakes". 
((The brakes were applied. A reasonable mind 
could not conclude that defendant was negligent in 
failing to utilize his then existing ability to avoid 
harming decedent, if he had any such ability. It 
was as reasonable, if not more reasonable to turn 
left as to turn right. Defendant seemingly did all 
in his power to avoid harming decedent. Certainly 
there is no evidence that defendant had a last clear 
chance to avoid harming decedent." 
Another Utah decision which supports appellant's 
position here that the last clear chance doctrine should 
not be applied, is Charvoz v. Cotrell, 12 Ut. 2d 25, 361 
P.2d 516. There, the decedent was struck by defendant's 
automobile at the time decedent was proceeding at night 
in the crosswalk at the intersection of 17th South and 19th 
East Streets, in Salt Lake City. The weather was dear 
and the road was dry. The lower court's verdict was for 
defendant and the trial court denied a motion for a new 
trial. The Supreme Court ruled that the last clear chance 
doctrine has no application to the facts of the case. 
Appellant contended that defendant ((could have avoided 
the accident by either sounding the horn of the automobile 
or swerving to the right." His argument was that the 
case fell directly within the provisions of the aforesaid 
Section 480, Restatement of Torts. The uncontradicted 
testimony established that defendant was traveling at about 
_\0 miles per hour when he first saw the pedestrian's situa-
tion some 60 to 65 feet ahead of him. Defendant did not 
blow his horn or tum aside but did immediately apply his 
brakes. His car took about two seconds to cover the dis-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
24 
tance from where he first observed decedent to the point 
of impact. Reviewing this testimony, the Supreme Court 
commented: 
((It is possible that the decedent could have 
extricated himself from his peril if warned by the 
sound of a horn, and it is possible that the defend-
ant could have avoided the accident had he swerved 
to the right. However, the doctrine of last clear 
chance contemplates a last clear chance, not a last 
possible chance. The doctrine implies thought, 
appreciation, mental direction and the lapse of 
sufficient time to effectually act upon the impulse 
to save another from injury." 
Except for the fact in the present case that Mr. Jones 
was in an automobile instead of standing in the path of the 
bus, our fact situation is quite similar to that of the Char-
voz case. From the testimony of ~Aiss Ferris, the bus 
passenger, and the uncontradicted testimony of Mr. Knut-
son, the bus driver, it appears that he was going between 
1 0 and 12 miles per hour when Jones made the second 
((sudden, unexpected stop", and that the bus was then 
about four car lengths back, that is, 70 feet or less. We 
therefore may safely conclude that the bus required up to 
four seconds to cover the distance from where Knutson 
saw the plaintiff's second stop to the point of the collision. 
We have the well established fact that the bus hit the Jones 
car almost immediately after the sounding of the horn and 
while the car passenger, Meier, was handing the shoe across 
to the lady in the parked car. Those facts establish that 
the bus driver did not have the clear chance or the time 
for appreciation and mental direction required in the rul-
ing of the Supreme Court in the Charvoz case, supra. As 
that decision aptly phrased the point: 
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((It would not be sufficient that it appear from 
hindsight that by some possible measure the defend-
ant by the «skin of his teeth' could have avoided 
the injury." 
It must be noted and kept in mind at all times that 
the doctrine of last clear chance, as enunciated in the above 
quoted Restatement of Torts and by the Courts, is based 
on the major premise that the plaintiff is in a position 
of danger. Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and 
Practice, Volume 4, Part 2, Section 2803, states the general 
rule to be ((that, in order to invoke the last clear chance 
doctrine, the injured person seeking its benefit must have 
been in obvious and imminent peril." Now, in our case, 
plaintiff's uperil" did not arise, if at all, until he had made 
his second stop; and, as heretofore indicated, Mr. Knutson, 
the bus driver, then had no clear opportunity or chance 
as those terms are defined by the law, to avert the collision. 
His situation at that time was made more difficult because 
his way to the right of the Jones' automobile was, blocked 
by the parked car and his way to the left was foreclosed by 
the passing westbound car. 
Furthermore, plaintiff's negligence continued up un-
til the time of the impact, just as decedent's negligence 
did in the Utah case of Compton v. Ogden Union Railway, 
supra, where the train overtook decedent as she walked 
along the track. 
As this Court observed in Anderson v. Bingham & 
Garfield Railway Co., supra; 
ccThe doctrine of last clear chance is a limita-
tion on the defense of contributory negligence; the 
doctrine should not be extended further in its 
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application than it can be supported by cogent 
reasoning.'' 
The low·er court's Instruction No. 9 lists as one of 
the requirements of the doctrine of last clear chance, a 
jury finding that ((plaintiff was in a position of danger." 
Because the instruction is indefinite, we cannot deter-
mine with any certainty what position of plaintiff the 
court intended to cover. But regardless of the wording of 
the instruction, the court committed reversible error in 
giving it. 
Viewing the evidence most favorably for respondent, 
it establishes at most that Mr. Jones was· not in a position 
of peril until he made his second, final stop prior to the 
collision. That stop occurred in the lane of traffic ahead 
of the bus, beside a parked car, and without any arm signal 
from the driver. When that unexpected situation abruptly 
confronted Mr. Knutson, the bus driver, he had no fair 
and clear opportunity to avoid the accident. Mr. Jones 
himself, up until the last moment, had as good an oppor-
tunity as did Mr. Knutson to avoid it. From the time the 
defendant realized, or should have realized the plaintiff's 
position of peril, the defendant did all that reasonably 
could be required of him to avoid harming the plaintiff; 
the burden was on the plaintiff to prove otherwise and 
that, he failed to do. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellants respectfully submit that the facts and the 
law of this case establish that plaintiff was guilty of con-
tributing negligence as a matter of law, and that appel-
lants are entitled to a judgment of reversal, and dismissal 
of plaintiff's suit. 
Appellants also urge that the trial court's refusal to 
give defendants' requested instruction No. 7 (on plain-
tiff's failure to give a hand signal) constitutes reversible 
error. 
Appellants further submit that the lower court's in-
struction No. 9 containing the last clear chance doctrine 
also constitutes error and in itself justifies a reversal and 
a new trial for appdlants. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
R.M. CHILD 
W. J. O'CONNOR, JR. 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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